

Deterrence And Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958

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be determined and consequently tested for in various empirical cases of arms control.

Weber starts off with an interesting puzzle as the focus of his research, but falls short of developing an adequate theory when he decides to force it into Axelrod's framework instead of developing and testing his own ideas. Contrary to what Weber claims, the IPD framework can explain failures to cooperate—for example, the ecology of strategies could be such that TFT and other strategies that elicit cooperation cannot succeed, and defection is the dominant outcome. But this is clearly an explanation that cannot be applied to arms control because there are only two nations interacting. Instead of recognizing that Axelrod's IPD model is inappropriate for his empirical interests, Weber engages in a rhetorical exercise to convince the reader that certain issues in arms control can be looked at using the inappropriate IPD framework. When Axelrod's IPD framework is clearly inadequate, Weber attaches ideas from other theories which then make his theory internally inconsistent.

There are clearly many interesting avenues to explore regarding the role of Weber's structural variables and the possibility of cooperation in arms control. To accomplish this, Axelrod's IPD framework could be set aside, and a theory more appropriate to arms control developed.

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Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958. By Shu Guang Zhang. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. 302pp. \$37.95.

Traditional studies of deterrence have frequently suffered from one of two problems: (1) excessive theoretical abstraction or (2) the incomplete treatment of the bilateral nature of a deterrent relationship. Shu Guang Zhang's *Deterrence and Strategic Culture* is an attempt to avoid these two problems by looking carefully at both sides of a deterrent relationship, in this case the U.S.-Chinese relationship from 1949 to 1958. Drawing on newly available materials that illuminate Chinese policy, as well as recently declassified U.S. documents, Zhang examines seven "mutual deterrence" situations: (1) efforts by Chinese leaders in 1949-50 to deter U.S. intervention against the communists and the Truman administration's calculations about such intervention, (2) Truman's dispatch of the Seventh Fleet in June 1950 to the Taiwan Strait and Beijing's response, (3) the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by UN/U.S. forces and Chinese intervention, (4) the endgame bargaining in the Korean War, (5) the possibility of American and Chinese intervention during the Indochina crisis of 1954, and (6-7) the First and Second Taiwan Straits crises in 1954-55 and 1958 (pp. 11-12). The rich historical detail will be of particular use to those interested in early U.S.-Chinese relations, while the theoretical framework draws attention to underlying assumptions of parts of the deterrence literature and raises questions about the role of culture-bound perceptions in deterrent situations.

Deterrence and Strategic Culture has the same blend of theoretical analysis and historical research found elsewhere in the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Series (e.g., Posen's *Sources of Military Doctrine* [1984] and Brown's *Flying Blind* [1992]). As Zhang notes, his work "does not aim at deducing concepts, or theories from

historical 'illustrations', but attempts to depict the problem of deterrence as much as possible on the basis of detailed historical evidence" (p. 9). The discussion of deterrence theory and previous efforts to understand historical examples of deterrent behavior is brief, setting the stage for the heart of the book, which is the historical accounts. Zhang argues that traditional deterrence theory, with its usual assumptions of an aggressor and a defender, focus on single instances of deterrence, and lack of attention to the mixed means that states can use to achieve deterrence, is inadequate to explain the behavior of the United States and China in these cases. By carefully examining both sides of the deterrent equation, with particular attention to how each actor viewed the crisis and the motives and actions of the other, Zhang clearly outlines the interaction of perceptions and behavior that drove these crises. His argument is that rather than finding an aggressor and defender, leaders on both sides assumed that their side was the defender, which complicates analysis within traditional deterrence theory. While leaders' assuming that opponents are acting from hostile intentions is not a new idea, Zhang does raise interesting questions about the broad applicability of standard deterrence theory to these (and potentially other) cases. What is needed, Zhang argues, is greater attention to the outlooks and perceptual frameworks of each side of the dispute, as well as attention to the sources of those frameworks. Attention to the impact of culture-bound perceptions is the offered solution to this problem.

I have a few disappointments. Several spelling errors detracted from the otherwise excellent writing in the text. More worrisome, many serious errors in quotations and references were found. My substantive disappointment is that there was insufficient attention paid to the "strategic culture" aspect of deterrence. Zhang's theoretical discussion provides a framework for the historical accounts, and its use adds depth and texture to the description of the dynamics of the bilateral relationship in these various incidents. Unfortunately, the discussion of the impact of different cultural, historical, and political phenomena on deterrent behavior is too limited. The final chapter touches on the impact of culture-bound perceptions by discussing each country's definition of security interests and perceptions of external threat and the impact of differing policymaking processes on each side of the dispute. Zhang notes that the problem was not that the United States and China had different cultures, but rather that each nation's leaders ignored the fact that (p. 272) American leaders frequently ignored messages emanating from the Chinese leadership via the official press, dismissing them as mere "propaganda" when, in fact, many of the items were drafted by top leaders, including Mao. Chinese leaders were unable to understand the pluralistic nature of American government and tended to assume that speeches by pro-Chiang Kai-shek members of Congress, lobbyists, and military officials reflected official policy and that White House statements were mere "smokescreens" (pp. 266-77). By doing so, each side's views of the intentions and motivations of the other was skewed, adding to the difficulty of successfully achieving deterrence. Although not stated explicitly, Zhang's discussion suggests that much of our thinking about deterrence, as well as our different leaders' ways of viewing deterrent relationships, is very culture-bound. Zhang's richly textured discussion of the dy-

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